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A CRITICAL SURVEY OF CERTAIN PHASES OF TRIAL
PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES.
In spite of frequent criticism of the administration of jus-
tice in criminal cases in the United States, we hear of no great
wave of legislative reform, sweeping the country, for the im-
provement of existing conditions. Mr. Moorfield Storey has
said in his "Reform of Legal Procedure," that "there is no
part of its work in which the law fails so absolutely -and so ludi-
crously as in the conviction and punishment of criminals and its
failures in this respect endanger the whole foundation of so-
ciety." Unfortunately this is too nearly the truth. The fact
that our criminal procedure is being severely criticized, that
reform is obviously in order, suggested to. the writer the criti-
cal investigation of certain phases of trial procedure in criminal
cases, which have been especially criticized, the results of which
are now submitted for the consideration of the profession.
I. CONTINUANCES.
It is but fair that the defendant should have a reasonable
time to prepare his case; that he should not be forced to trial in
the absence of his counsel, where such absence is unavoidable or
without notice to him; that the case should not be tried in the
absence of material witnesses, whose attendance either party has
been unable to secure. So in the several States, by statute or
decision the postponement of criminal trials for cause is per-
mitted. The California Penal Code1 provides that "Wben an
action is called for trial or at any time previous thereto, the court
may upon sufficient cause direct the trial to be postponed to
another day." There are similar brief statutory provisions in a
number of the States, while in others, there are many sections,
specifying causes for which a continuance may be had and out-
lining in detail the procedure which is to be followed upon appli-
cation for a continuance. The limits of this article will not per-
mit a discussion of matters of purely local procedure. As to the
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grounds for which a continuance may be granted, it is submitted
that the California statute is quite sufficient in providing that a
continuance may be granted for sufficient cause, leaving the
court to determine what cause shall be considered sufficient in
the particular case. This is believed to be better than an attempt
to enumerate all the conceivable circumstances which will make
the granting of a continuance proper.
It is a very general rule that a motion for a continuance is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, under all the cir-
cumstances of the case; and while an appellate court will super-
vise the action of the trial court on such motion, it will not
reverse, unless such action was plainly erroneous and manifestly
operated as a denial of justice.2 If there has been in fact an
abuse of discretion, the appellate court will reverse the case. In
Brown v. State," the defendant had been arrested in another
county and brought to the county of trial, where he was con-
fined in jail; he arrived there at night, and the following morning
was brought into court for trial. From poverty he had been
unable to employ counsel, and the judge appointed an attorney
to represent him. The attorney, after a consultation of five min-
utes with the accused, reported to the court that the accused
was not ready to go to trial; that counsel had had no opportun-
ity to have witnesses subpoenaed, nor to examine the law of the
case, and that no preparation whatever had been made for the
defense. He asked the court to pass the case till the following
morning, in ordet that he might send for witnesses and prepare
the defense. The refusal of the continuance under these cir-
cumstances was held error.
Lack of preparation on the part of counsel has frequently
been urged as ground for continuance, and may or may not move
the court to exercise its discretion in granting it. It is quite clear,
however, that the continuance will be refused if counsel is un-
prepared merely because of the pressure of other court work,
'Hite v. Commonwealth, 31 S. 1. Rep. 895 (Va. x898) ; Hamilton v. State,
62 Ark. 543 (1896); and see also State v. Howard, 3o Mont. 5i8 (i9o4);
State v. Underwood, 35 Wash. 558 (z9o4); State v. Douglas, xx6 La. 524
(19o6); Trask v. People, 151 IU. 523 (1894).
a i"o Ga. 145 (i9o4) and see Miller v. United States, 8 Okla. 315 (I89 -.
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rendering inconvenient his careful study of the case,4 or if the
defendant has been himself negligent in procuring the assistance
of counsel. 5 A refusal under these circumstances is not an abuse
of discretion. The absence of counsel from the trial may be a
good ground for continuance, as where defendant's counsel is
absent on the morning of the trial without notice to him;6 but
the absence of one of counsel is not good ground for-continuance
where other competent counsel are present.7
By statute in Tennessee the court may grant a continuance
because of local prejudice and excitement which may harm the
accused," and it has been held that this is a good ground for a
continuance in the absence of such a statute, 9 but this is not
everywhere the rule, as it has sometimes been said that while
popular excitement and prejudice may be ground for a change of
venue, it certainly is not good ground for a continuance.10 In
an appropriate case, ill health of the accused may be ground for
a continuance, but as to the existence of this cause, like that of
local prejudice and* excitement, the court will usually receive
affidavits or testimony in contradiction. 1
Of the several causes for which continuances are granted,
however, that most often alleged and most frequently the sub-
ject of abuse has been* the absence of witnesses. Because so
often alleged as a ground for continuance, and because of the
tendency to ask a continuance on this ground without sufficient
reason, courts and legislatures alike have been inclined to draw
rather close restrictions about the granting of continuances for
the absence of witnesses. So it has been held that the applica-
tion for a continuance must show where the witness resides, if
'Baker v. State, uii Ga. 141 (i9oo); Smith v. State, 132 Ind. 145 (1892).
'Moody v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1198 (1897); State v. Inks,
135 Mo. 678 (1896).
'Leslie v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rep. i2o (1897); see also Kuehn v.
State, 47 Tex. Cr. 636 (i9o5).
'People v. Durant, 119 Cal. 201 (1897); Mason v. State, 81 S. W. Rep.
718 (Texas, i9o4).
"Tennessee, Code of 1896, §7172.
'State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 48o (!goo).
" State v. Rice, 7 Idaho, 762 (igoi).
"Territory v. Shankland, 3 Ariz. 403 (1892); Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss.
223 (189).
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his residence is known, 12 the probability of securing the attend-
ance of the witness by the next tenn,' 3 the facts constituting the
diligence exercised to procure his attendance, 14 the facts ma-
terial to the case to which it is believed the witness, if present,
would testify,' and that there is no other witness by whom these
facts may be so readily shown.1 ' An application is insufficient
which merely states thait "due diligence was used to procure the
attendance of the witness" or that "the absent testimony is ma-
terial to the case." General averments are insufficient. The facts
constituting the alleged diligence must be stated, and the facts
to which th.e witness would testify, in order that the court may
determine whether there was due diligence and whether the ab-
sent testimony is in fact material.
Some very interesting questions have arisen as to what con-
stitutes material testimony, for the absence of which *a continu-
ance should be granted. In Miller v. Slate'7 the defendant was
being tried for murder; the absent witness was one who was
present at the shooting, and would testify that defendant did not
fire the shot, but that it was fired by another person; that de-
ceased was several hundred feet east of the dance hall when the
shot was fired, and the accused was then in the back part of the
dance hall, where he could not have fired the shot. The appellate
court held the -refusal of a continuance error, the absent testi-
mony being obviously'material. In Allen v. State"8 the testimony
of the absent witness would have established an alibi, and the
refusal of the continuance was held error. If the absent testi-
molly, if procured, would be merely cumulative, there is no error
' Donald v. State, 41 So. Rep. 4 (Miss. i9o6).
' Sims v. State, 45 S. W. Rep. 705 (Tex. 1896) ; Easterlin v. State, 43 Fla.
565 (19o).
"Pnckett v. State, 71 Ark. 62 (i902); State v. Johnson, 70 Kan. 861
(1905).
"Wiggins v. State, ioi Ga. 5o2 (1897); State v. Hawkins, 2 Penn. 475
(Del. i9oo).
"Miller v. State, 29 Neb. 437 (iSo); Trim v. State, 33 So. Rep. 78
(Miss. 19o3); State v. Penney, 113 Ia. 691 (19oo).
V 29 Neb. 437 (1890).
i112 Ga. 752 (Qoo): see also Thompson v. S:ate, 78 S. V. Rep. 691 (Tex
x9o4) : Compton v. State, io8 Ga. 747 (1899) ; Long v. State, g Tex. Cr. 461
(1898).
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in refusing a continuance," though it seems a distinction must
be taken between evidence that is cumulative merely, and that
which is corroborative. In Cathright v. State"0 a prosecution
for an assault with intent to commit murder, the defendant
would testify to facts showing that he fired the shot in self-
defense; he asked a continuance for the absence of a witness who
would testify to the same facts and would thus corroborate the
testimony of the accused. The refusal of the continuance was
held error. The absence of witnesses to prove character is not
good ground for continuance, where other witnesses might be
procured to testify in regard to it,21. and the same rule applies to
experts wfio are out of the jurisdiction, where others might be
called, of equal skill and experience. 22  A continuance may also
be properly refused where the proposed evidence would be inad-
missible,23 or is probably untrue,2 4 or is obviously immaterial.2
Not only must the absent evidence be material; there must
have been due diligence used to procure it. No hard and fast
rule can be stated as to what constitutes due diligence, but a case
or two may serve to illustrate the principle. In Benson v. State"
the homicide occurred on the evening of March 28. The ac-
cused was at once arrested, was indicted on the 29 th, and his
ease was set for trial April 4; immediately after procuring couh-
sel, and as soon as he could learn of witnesses to the killing he
applied for process, but was unable to procure the attendance of
his witnesses by the day of trial. The court held this such
reasonable diligence as entitled 'him to a continuance. But in
"Trim v. State, 33 So. Rep. 718 (Miss. z393); Lively v. State, 73 S. W.
Rep. 1o38 (Tex. 19o3).
"85 S. W. Rep. 1o6 (Tex. ioS).
"Jackson v. State, 62 S. W. Rep. 914 (Tex. igo) ; Pratt v. State, 75 Ark.
0o (1905).
'Bush v. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. L. Rep. si (1884).
"Post v. State, 14 Jnd. Ap. 4.52 (z895); Delk v. State, 99 Ga. 667 0896);
State v. Hollier, 49 La. An. 37z (iftg).
"State v. Demoss, 74 Kan. 173 (i9o6); Yancy v. State, 48 Tex. Cr.
166 (190); State v. Timberlake, so La. An. 3o8 (898).
'Greenwood v. State, 44 Tex. 177 i898); Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis.
56o (i89i); Davids v. People, t92 IlL z76 (igox).
"38 Tex. Cr. 487 (1897); see also Petit v. State, x3S Ind. 393 (1893);
Williams v. State, 23 So. Re .47 (Miss. 1898); O'Rear v. Commonwealth,
78 S. W. Rep. 406 (Ky. igS4).
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Shiver v. State,27 where the defendant was arrested July 26, x898,
and the case was set for trial in March, 1899, a failure to issue
a subpoena for a material witness until February 28, I899, was
held such a lack of diligence that the refusal of an application for
a continuance was not error.
The continuance has also been refused where it was im-
probable that the evidence would be procured; as where the ab-
sent witness was so infirm that there was no reasonable expecta-
tion of procuring her attendance 2 8 where the witness would in-
criminate himself by giving the proposed testimony,29 or where
such witness was a fugitive from justice.30 Where the contin-
uance is obviously asked only for delay,3 1 or is evidently not asked
in good faith,32 it will not be granted.
Another general rule is this: even if the application for a
continuance fulfills the usual "riquirements, yet the continuance
'vill be refused if the opposing party will make certain admissions
in regard to the absent testimony. In Kentucky and Indiana, at
least, by statute, the opposing party must admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the application for a continuance in order that
the continuance may be refused, 3 but in most .States, by decision
or statute, it is not necessary that the truth of the testimony be
admitted, but simply that the party admit that the absent witness,
if present, would testify as alleged; such admission being made,
the court must refuse to grant the continuance. 34  On the trial
evidence in contradiction may of course be introduced, or objec-
tion made as to the competency of the testimony.
35
"41 Fla. 630 (x899); see also Atkins v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 291 (1902);
Kidd v. State, ioi Ga. 528 (1897); Davis v. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. L Rep.
654 (1885).
" Brittain v. State, 4o S. NV. Rep. 297 (Tex. 1897).
' Burns v. State, 5x S. W. Rep. go5 (Tex. 1899).
• Stevens v. State, 49 S. W. Rep. xo4 (Tex. x899).
" State v. Jones, 53 NV. Va. 613 (19o3).
' State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426 (x894) ; State v. Belvel, 89 Ia. 405 (1893).
"Robinson v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 564 (9o2); Miller v. State,
9 nd. 340 (1857) ; State v. Schoonorer, 21 Ind. Ap. 52o (I899).
"R,,ssel v. State, 62 Neb. 512 (i9o); Thompson v. State, 5 Kan. 159
(1869); State v. St. Clair, 6 Ida. iog (i898); People v. Savant, 112 Mich.
2957 ( 197).
'State v. Leuhrsman, r28 Ia. 476 (9o4); State v. High, x16 La. 79
(19o5).
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Because of the frequency with which the absence of wit-
nesses is alleged as ground for continuance, and the abuse which
has prevailed in regard to it, it is undoubtedly advisable to hedge
about the granting of continuances on this ground with very nec-
essary safeguards, and it is believed that the Wyoming statute36
does this more completely than any others. It is as follows:
"A motion to postpone the trial of a case in any of the
courts of this state, on account of the absence of evidence, can
be made only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evi-
dence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been
used to obtain it, and where the evidence may be; and, if it is
for an absent witness, the affidavit must show where the witness
resides, if his residence is known to affiant, and the probabilities
of procuring his testimony within a reasonable time, and that
his absence has not been procured by the act or connivance of
the party, nor by others at his request; nor with his knowledge
or consent, and what facts he believes the witness will prove,
and that he believes them to be true, and that he is unable to
prove such facts by any other witness whose testimony can be
as readily procured. If thereupon the adverse party will con-
sent that, on the trial, the facts stated in the affidavit shall be
taken as true, if the absent evidence is written or documentary,
and in case of a witness that he will testify to the facts stated
in the affidavit as true, the trial shall not be postponed for that
cause; and, in such case, the party against whom such evidence
is used shall have the right to impeach the evidence of such
absent witness, as in case where the witness is present or his
deposition is used."
It will be noticed that this statute applies the rule to absent evi-
dence, written or documentary, as well as to absent witnesses.
The amendment of an .application for a continuance is usu-
ally not allowed; if permitted at all it is held to be entirely within
the discretion of the trial court."7 "The court may also, after
granting a continuance, vacate its order; at least unless setting
aside the continuance operates unfavorably to the interests of the
party applying therefor.a It is usually held that the defendant
need not be present at the hearing of the application, 9 as will be
seen in a subsequent section of this article.
=Compiled Statutes, x9o, §5139.
'State v. Good, 132 Mo. 714 (1895).
"Sampson v. Pcople, i88 Ill. 592 (igor).
"O'Boyle v. Commonwealth, mo Va. 785 (19o); Kibler v. Common-
wealth, 94 Va. 8o4 (1897); State v. Hall, x89 Mo. 262 (x9o5).
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There is some difference of opinion as to whether a con-
tinuance having been applied for by affidavit, counter affidavits
may be received to show that it should not be granted. In a few
States counter affidavits are improper for any purpose, but by
the weight of authority they may be received, at least to show
want of diligence in procuring the testimony of an absent wit-
ness, or want of good faith in the application, to show that it is
improbable that the .proposed testimony can be obtained, to con:
tradict an averment that a witness or counsel who is absent is
sick, or to dispose of the allegations of public excitement or
prejudice.40 To prevent any imposition upon the court, it seems
only right and proper that counter affidavits should under such
circumstances be receivable to show that the continuance should
not be granted.
II. CUSTODY AND RESTRAINT OF DEFENDANT.
The common law rule was that "although under an indict-
ment of the highest nature, the prisoner must be brought to the
bar without irons or any manner of shackles or bonds, unless
there be evident danger of an escape, and then he may be secured
with irons.' 4 1 In accordance with the principle thus 'expressed,
it is provided by statute in many States that "a person charged
with a public offense shall not before conviction be subjected to
any more restraint than is necessary for his detention to answer
the charge." The earliest American case on the sttbject appears
to be People v. Harrington.42 In that case, a prosecution for rob-
bery, when the jtirywere sworn, the defendants were in court and
in irons. Their counsel asked that the irons be removed during
the trial, but the court refused to order this done, being of the
opinion that no rights of the defendants were violated by their
being tried in irons without their consent. The appellate court,
'Shoun v. State, zit Tenn. t66 (193); Lane v. State, 67 Ark ago
(My,)); Ransomx v. State, 7o S. AV. Rep. 95o (Tex. t90); .]alderman v. Terri-
tory, 7 Ariz. s2o (19o): Territory v. Shankland, 3 Ariz. 403 (18P2). See
also Georgia Code, 19it. Vol. 11, §Wz: "The presiding judges may in their
discretion admit a counter showing to a motion for a continuance, and after
a hearing may decide whether the motion shall prevaiL"
a4 Black. Com. 322; and see a Hale P. C. 219; Kely. 7, 10.
042 Cal. i6s 087s). a
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after conviction, granted a new trial, holding that any order or
action of the court which without evident necessity imposes phys-
ical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the
progress of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass
his mental faculties and thereby materially to abridge and preju-
dicially affect his constitutional rights and is a direct violation of
the common law rule and of the Criminal Practice Act.
Where there is such "evident necessity" for shackling the
defendant, such restraint as is necessary may be imposed, and
whether such necessity exists or not, it is largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court to determine. In Faire v. State,43 during
the trial, prisoner's counsel discovered for the first time that the
defendant, who sat in full view of the jury during the whole
trial, was shackled with leg irons; counsel objected, moving to
have the irons removed. But the sheriff having explained to the
court reasons for believing the defendant would esape, or at
least create a scene in the court room unless secured, the motion
was overruled. The court held:
"It requires an extreme case to justify shackles or manacles
on a prisoner undergoing trial, but whether or not this is neces-
sary must be left to the enlightened and conscientious discretion
of the lower court in view of all the circumstances of the par-
ticular case."
So a desperate defendant, it is held, may be shackled in going to.
and from the courthouse and the shackles be removed and put on
before the jury;44 a fugitive from justice or prisoner likely to
escape may be properly secured ;45 and where a dangerous charac-
ter was on trial for murder in the first degree, it was held not im-
proper to maintain an armed guard over him during the entire
trial.4'
Even in the absence of such evident necessity, the rule has
not always been strictly applied. In State v. A1160 7 the defend-
058 Ala. 74 (1877).
"State v. Temple, 194 Mo. z28 (igo$).
" Upstone v. People, 1o9 11. 1(9 (iPR3); Poe v. State, io Lea, 673 (Tenn.
1882).
'State -,. D,,ncan, 116 Mo. 288 (1893).
614S W. Va. 66 (x8gS).
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ant was manacled during a part of the trial, but the moment the
matter was brought to the attention of the court, the manacles
were ordered removed and were at once removed in the presence
of the jury. The court refused to set aside a conviction, as it was
quite obvious that under all the circumstances no harm could
possibly have come to the defendant. In Vela v. Slate4 8 the de-
fendant did not object at all to his shackles during trial, and
failed to show that he was harmed by being shackled; the appel-
late court refused to disturb the conviction.
In many cases, however, because of the imposition of what
the court considered undue restraint, new trials have been granted.
The case most often cited in this connection is State v. Kring.
49
The record showed that the court having directed the trial to
proceed, the defendant, who was ironed with handcuffs, by his
counsel moved the court to have his manacles removed. This the
court refused to do, overruling the motion. The appellate court
held:
"It was not pretended in this "case that there was danger
of an escape. Had this danger existed, however, we are of the
opinion that it would have been error, even then, to keep the
prisoner's hands fettered in the presence of the jury during the
trial of the case."
The rule here stated goes too far, limiting the discretion of the
court even in cases where it may be advisable to have the defend-
ant securely shackled. In other cases, while the proposition has
not been quite so. emphatically stated, judgment has been reversed
because the defendant was subjected to restraint during his trial.
entirely without inquiry as to whether he was harmed by the pro-
ceedings,8 0 and even in the absence of objection thereto. 1 It is
submitted that in all such cases, the court should be permitted to
inquire into the question of prejudice to the accused and should
not grant new trials unless prejudice has resulted. Legislation
"33 Tex. Cr. 322 (1894) ; and see Burks v. State, 5o Tex. Cr. 47 (i9o6);
Matthews v. State, 9 Lea, 128 (Tenn. 1882) ; Canon v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 398
(91o); Rainey v. State, 2o Tex. Ap. 455 (1886).
" 64 Mo. 591 (1877).
"State v. Smith, it Ore. 2o5 (1883); State v. Williains, x8 Vash. 47
(1897).
"Lee v. State, 5i Miss. s66 0875).
CRITICISM OF CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
bringing about this result is advisable. Let the direction be that
defendant be not unduly restrained; but if through mistake or
inadvertence, or even intentionally, the trial court fail to order his
shackles to be removed during the trial, let no new trial be granted
unless the defendant has been actually prejudiced by the action of
the court.
SIIL PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT.
Formerly in England, counsel might represent a prisoner in
trials for treason or for misdemeanor, but not in trials for felony;
as the accused in such cases could only defend himself, it was held
that he must be present in court whenever any step was taken in
his case, however insignificant or unimportant. The old English
cases on this subject we re very strictly followed in the early jur-
isprudence of America, and in adhering blindly and tenaciously to
the rule that defendant must be present during his trial for felony
American legislatures and courts have lost sight of the reason
upon which it was founded. The right of the defendant to be
present during his trial for a criminal offense is not expressly
given by our comtitutions. Some of the courts, which have de-
dared that the accused has such a right and have based their
claim upon constitutional grounds, found their arguments upon
the constitutional provisions that the defendant shall have a right
to be heard by himself and by counsel, and that he shall have a
right to meet the witnesses face to face.
An examination of the statutes now existent in this country
reveals a rather general rule that if the prosecution be for felony,
the defendant must personally be present during the trial, but if
for misdemeanor, the trial may be had in his absence. As to mis-
demeanors, it is variously provided that the defendant, at his
own request and by leave of court, may be tried in his absence; or
that if the defendant is not himself present, he must appear by
counsel; or that if the defendant's presence is necessary for the
purpose of identification, he may be required to attend. Several
States have also provided by statute that the defendant must ap-
pear in. person before the verdict is received in felony cases, but
need not in prosecutions for misdemeanor. Texas52 requires
"Revised Criminal Statutes, igir, §764
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presence of the defendant at verdict in felony, unless he have
escaped after the commencement of the trial. In Missouri" a
verdict may be received in defendant's absence, whenever such
absence is willful or voluntary. The following rather unusual
provisions may be noted: In Mississippi 4 in criminal cases the
presence of the prisoner may be waived and the trial progress at
the discretion of the court, if he be in custody and consenting
thereto; in Ohio55 if a person indicted escape or forfeit his recog-
nizance after the jury is sworn, it is provided that the trial shall
nevertheless proceed, and the verdict be received and recorded;
in Arkansas 8 if the defendant escape from custody after the
trial has commenced, or if, being on bail, he absent himself dur-
ing his trial, the trial may either be stopped, or progress to a ver-
dict, at the discretion of the prosecuting attorney. In the Codes
of Canada and New Zealand may be found the following excep-
tional provision:
"The court may permit the accused to be out of court dur-.
ing the whole or any part of the trial on such terms as it thinks
proper.'"T
Such a clause is not found in any of the American statutes.
In misdemeanors, then, the trial may in general be had58 and
the verdict received 9 in the absence of the defendant. It cannot
be said, however, that the defendant has a right in such cases to
be tried in his absence; it is for the court to determine, in the exer-
cise of its sound discretion, whether the trial may proceed in the
absence of the accused, or whether he shall be required to attend;
the exercise of this discretion by the trial court will not be re-
viewed on appeal, unless there has been a palpable abuse.8 0
"Annotated Statutes, x9o6, Vol. II, §2650.
"Code, 19o6, §149S.
"Code, 19io, Vol. III, §W3676.
' Digest of Statutes, 1904, §2339.
Canada, Revised Statutes, i9o6, Vol. 3, §943; New Zealand, Consolidated
Statutes, Vol. 1, §433.
" State v. Lucker, 4o S. C. 549 (1803) ; People v. Budd, 57 Cal. 349 (x88).
"Gage v. State, 9 Tex. Cr. 259 (8o); Holliday v. People, 9 Ill. 111
(1847).
" State v. G -rland, 67 Me. 423 (1877) ; Owen v. State, 38 Ark. 512 (1882);
Bridges v. State, 38 Ark. 51o (1882).
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Whether the entire trial may be had in the absence of both de-
fendant and his counsel depends upon the phraseology used in
the statute; under some of the statutes and decisions rendered
under them, the trial may be bad in the absence of the defendant
only if he appear by counset l1
In the trial of felonies, the defendant has a right to be pres-
ent "during trial." It immediately becomes necessary that we
understand the meaning of this phrase and determine whether
every step in the proceeding, however trivial, is important enough
to require his presence. The absence of the defendant has been
held error during the impanelling and selection of the jury,62 the
examination of witnesses, 3 the argument of counsel, 64 the charge
of the court or giving of additional instructions or reading evi-
dence to the jury after retirement, 5 the rendition of the verdict,
and the discharge of the jury.67 But it is ginerally held to be im-
material if the defendant is absent at proceedings preliminary or
subsequent to the trial proper, or not amounting to substantive
steps in the case,68 such as the amendment of an indictment, the
making of an orderi setting the date of trial, the drawing of a
special venire from the jury box, the appointment of counsel to
assist in the prosecution, the hearing of an application for the
attachment of a witness, the recognizance of witnesses to appear
in another court, or amendment of the verdict. Motions to
State v. Young, 86 Ia. 406 (1892) ; Lawn v. People, ix Col. 343 (1888).
"Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370 (1892).
"Bearden v. State, 44 Ark. 331 (1884); Bennett v. State, 62 Ark 517
(1896); Burtbn v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 493 (19o4); State v. Sheppard, 49
W. Va. 582 (x91).
"Tiller v. State, 96 Ga. 431 (1895) ; Rose v. State, 2o Ohio, 31 (i851).
*State v. Blackwelder, 6i N. C. 38 (1866); People v. Kohler, $ Cal. 72
(1855) ; Jones v. State, 26 Ohio St. 2o8 (1875); State v. Meagher, 49 Mo.
Ap. 571, 58i (1892) ; Witt v. State, 5 Cold. iz (Tenn. 1867).
"People v. Perkins, i Wend. 91 (N. Y. 1828) ; State v. Buckner, 25 Mo.
167 (1857); State v. Hughes, 2 Ala. io2 (184i).
g'State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75 (i8go) ; State v. Spores, 4 Ore. i98 (1871);
State v. Muir, 32 Kan. 481 (1884).
" State v. Dominique, 39 La. An. 323 (1887); State v. Abrams, 8 Pac.
Rep. 327 (Ore. 1883); Hurd v. State, zx6 Ala. 44o (897); Hall v. State,
132 Ind. 317 (1892); State v. Simien, 36 La. An. 923 (1884); Bolling v.
State, 54 Ark. 588 (i89); McNamara v. State, 6o Ark. 400 (1895). But cf.
Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17 (i88i); Baker v. State, 39 Ark. i8o (882);
Brown v. State, 38 Tex. 482 (1873).
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quash an indictment, for a continuance or change of venue, for a
new trial or in arrest of judgment, are riot by most courts consid-
ered of such importance as to require the presence of the defend-
ant during their determination,(" but as to these proceedings the
cases are not entirely in accord.70
The absence of the defendant at the discharge of the jury
is in some jurisdictions more serious than at any other time dur-
ing the trial; an absence at other times is but ground for a new
trial; but where the defendant is absent when the jury are dis-
charged, it has been held that the discharge, being improper, works
an acquittal of the accused, whether it be discharged before ver-
dict, 71-as for illness of a juror, inability of the jury to agree, or
other cause,-or a discharge upon rendition of the verdict.72 In
Brister v. State,"3 when the jury returned with their verdict the
prisoners were not in court but in jail, though the court did not
know this; the clerk was directed to receive the verdict, and did
receive it and read it aloud in the presence of the court; the court
then told the jury they were discharged, but noticing immediately
that the prisoners were not present, told the jury they were not
discharged, before they left the box. The sheriff was told to
bring in the prisoners; when they were brought it, they objected to
the reception of the veidict, but the objection was overruled and
the verdict received. It was held that the court's revocation of the
discharge was in time.
The courts are fairly well agreed that the defendant has a
right to be present during the more important steps in the trial;
they do not agree as to the less important steps which we have
discussed. Statutes not providing that the defendant has a right to
'Epps v. State, 1o2 Ind. 539 (1885); State v. Atkinson, 40 S. C. 365
(1893); Kibler v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 804 (1897), but cf. Shelton v.
Commonwealth, 89 Va. 450 (i892) ; State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. x5g (x876) ; Jones
v. State, 152 Ind. 318 (898) ; People v. Ormsby, 48 Mich. 495 (7882); State
v. Jefcoat, 20 S. C. 383 (r883) ; Ward v. Territory, 8 Okla. 12 ('899).
"Cf. contra to cases cited in note 69: State v. Clifton, 57 Kan. 448 (i8g6);
Ex parte Bryan, 44 Ala. 402 (i87o); Gibson v. State, 3 Tex. Cr. 437 (1878).
" Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 624 (1896); State v. Wilson, 50 Ind.
486 (1875); State v. Sommers, 6o Minn. go (1895).
"Nolan v. State, 55 Ga. 521 (1875); State v. Hays, 2 Lea, z56 (Tenn.
1879), but cf. cases cited in note 67, where only a new trial wag granted.
"26 Ala. 107 (1855). And see in accord, State v. Hutchinson, 95 Ia. 566
('895).
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be or must be present "during trial," a phrase that has been given
a variety of definitions, but naming the various steps in the pro-
ceeding during which he has a right to be present, would bring
about greater uniformity of decision and would be for that reason
advisable.
An absence is usually taken to mean an absence from the
courtroom, but this is not necessarily the case. In Crowell v.
People,74 after the jury had been out two hours, they were brought
into court by the officer and at their request for an instruction as
to the nature of the punishment, the court gave them the instruc-
tion. The defendant was in the courtroom, but was sick, and
was lying on a bench fifty feet fron- the judge. The instruction
was read loud enough to be heard all over the courtroom. It was
held that the objection that the instruction was given in the ab-
sence of the defendant was not well taken. But in State v. Man-
nion75 a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, when
the prosecuting witness expressed a fear at testifying before the
defendant, the court required him to take a seat in a part of the
courtroom away from the jury and witness, where he could
neither hear said witness, nor could he see her nor the jury while
she was testi'fying. This was held an infringement of the de-
fendant's right to be present during his trial, and a new trial was
granted.
The defendant cannot object that he was not present at the
trial of his co-defendant ;76 nor can he object to the absence of
his counsel during his own trial; the absence of counsel even
during substantive steps in the proceeding is usually held not to
be error.
7"
It has been said that the defendant has a right to be present
during a trial for felony; in this connection we must discuss a
further question: May the defendant waive the right to be pres-
ent? There is the highest authority for saying that the right
cannot be waived, even by the express consent of the accused, in
24 tgo 111. So8 (i9oi).
"ig Utah, 305 (1899).
People v. O'Brien, 88 Col. 483 (s8g).
' laker v. State, 58 Ark. 513 (1894); Richardson v. State, 7 Tex. Ap.
436 (18,9).
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a capital case,7 8 and in favor of life, this would seem to be a
proper restriction of tle doctrine of waiver. But in cases less
than capital, though a few courts have said that the defendant
cannot waive the right to be present,7 9 the defendant, according
to the weight of authority, may waive the right, either ex-
pressly, 0 or by absconding or otherwise voluntarily absenting
himself during the trial. In Sahlinger v. Peoples' the defendant
was tried with others for larceny; he voluntarily absented him-
self from the courtroom before the conclusion of the trial, at the
time the instructions were given, and later when the verdict was
received. It was held:
"There is no doubt but that a prisoner on trial for a felony
has the right to be present at every step taken in his case, and it
would be error for the court to deprive him of that right with-
out his consent, unless it might become necessary to remove him
from the courtroom temporafily for disorderly conduct; but
where a prisoner after a trial has begun, wrongfully and volun-
tarily abandons the courtroom and refuses to appear, he must be
regarded as having waived a right which is guaranteed to him
if he sees proper to avail of it, and the court is under no obli-
gations to stop the trial until the defendant thinks proper to
return, but in such a case the court would not transcend any of
its legitimate powers by proceeding with the case to final judg-
ment."
Again, in Falk v. United States, 2 the court held:
"The rule to be derived from the authorities is that in all
cases involving less than capital punishment . when a
trial has been once begun, the flight or escape of the accused
person does not preclude the court from proceeding with the
cause and receiving the verdict of the jury in the absence of the
defendant, so caused by his wrongful act."
" Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (883) ; Jackson v. Commonwealth, ig Grat.
656 (Va. 187o); Gladden v. State, 12 Fla. 562 (1868).
"Sneed v. State, 5 Ark. 431 (1844); Andiews v. State, 2 Sneed, 55o
(Tenn. i855); Summerals v. State, 37 Fla. 163 (1896).
" Cawthon v. State, xr9 Ga. 395 (1.o3).
" 102 111. 241 (1882). See also People v. Bragle, 88 N. Y. 585 (1882);
State v. Gonce, 87 Mo. 627 (1885); State v. Ellvin, 51 Kan. 784 (1893);
Killman v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 57z (igo8); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa.
i89 (i8/8) ; Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675 (1864); Barton v. State, 67 Ga. 653
(z88z); Frey v. Circuit Judge, xo7 Mich. 130 (1895).
h 5 App. Cas. D. C. 446 (i899). See also Gore v. State, 52 Ark. 285
('889); Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, 181 (1835); State v. Hope, ioo Mo. 347
(x889); State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404 (1887).
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By statute in Queensland 3 it is provided that "the trial
must take place in the presence Qf the accused person, unless he so
conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings
in his presence impracticable, in which case the court may order
him to be removed, aid may direct the trial to proceed in his
absence." There appear to be no such statutes in any of our
States, and the question suggested by that quoted has seldom
arisen in the cases. In United States v. Davis5 4 the defendant
persisted in interrupting proceedings by denying in a loud voice
statements made by the district attorney in his opening address.
The court admonished him to refrain, but since the action of the
prisoner made it impossible to proceed with the trial with due
decorum, he was ordered removed and the trial proceeded during
that day in his absence; next day, when the prisoner was more
composed, the trial was continued in his presence. The action of
the trial co.urt in causing the prisoner to be removed during trial
being: subsequently brought in question, the higher court held:
"The right of a prisoner to be present at his trial does not
include the right to prevent a trial by unseemly disturbance.
The defendant had an opportunity to be present at the whole
of his trial. He was absent during a part of the opening only
because of his own disorderly conduct. It does not lie in his
mouth to complain of the order which was made necessary by
his own misconduct, and which he could at any time have termi-
nated by signifying his willingness to avoid creating a disturb-
ance."
The conduct of the accused in this case may, perhaps, be regarded
as constituting a waiver of his right to be present.
It has been held that, the defendant being absent, the mere
presence of his counsel during the trial, does not amount to a
waiver of the right to be present, 5 and while in Georgia it is held
that counsel may expressly waive this right of the accused,88
U Pub. Gen. Statutes, Vol. z, 617. Similarly, Canada, Revised Statutes,
i9o6. Vol. 111, §943; New Zealand, Consolidated Statutes, Vol. 1, §433.
"6 Blatch. 464 (1869). See also Regina v. Berry, io4 Law Times, rio
(Eng. 1898).
"Shipp v. State, ii Tex. Cr. 46 (i88t); Rose v. State, 2o Ohio, 31
(185): Roberts v. State, iti Ind. 3.1o (1887); Cook v. State, 6o Ala. 39
(5877).
TMHill v. State, si8 Ga. 21 (19o3); Cawthon v. State, rig Ga. 395 (5903).
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according to the weight of authority, even an express waiver by
counsel for the accused is ineffective, and is not binding upon him;
this appears to be the general rule, even in States which permit a
waiver by the defendant himself.s7
While, under our constitutions, it is probably necessary to
uphold the right of the defendant to be present when any substan-
tive steps are taken in a proceeding against him, he should cer-
tainly be held to have waived this right by any willful or volun-
tary absence, or by misconduct necessitating his removal. Per-
haps our legislatures and courts would- not go too far .in support-
ing the proposition that a waiver may be made by counsel, and if
so made, it will be as effective as if made by the aicused himself,
at least, unless the latter is able to show that he was prejudiced
by such waiver.
There is a difference of opinion as to the effect of an invol-
untary absence of the accused during a part of his trial. In
Cason v. State8 a witness was asked several important questions
in the defendant's absence, but, as soon as the court discovered
the absence, the jury were told to disregard everything that had
just been said; the defendant was brought in, and the- witness
re-examined; the court held that there were no grounds for re-
versal. On the other hand, in State v. Sheppards9 the following
questions and answers were received from a witness during an
enforced absence of the defendant:
"Q. What is your name, please? A. Flora Ayers. Q. What
is your husband's name? A. Jont Ayers."
The absence of the prisoner being then for the first time brought
to the attention of the court, the trial was stopped until he was
brought in, whereupon the same questions were asked and the
same answers received. The court granted a new trial, regarding it
a Martin v. State, 40 Ark. 364 (1883) ; State v. Myrick, 38 Kan. 238
(I888); Nomaque v. People, Breese, 1o9 (I1. 1825); Prine v. Commonwealth,
18 Pa. 103 (185I).
"52 Tex. Cr. 220 (0o7); State v. Paylor, 89 N. C. 39 (1883); State
v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33 (i89g); People v. LaMunion, 64 Mich. 709
(1887).
049 W. Va. 582 (89oi); State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 8oo(1883); Tiller v.
State, 96 Ga. 431 (1895).
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as immaterial that the defendant could not have been prejudiced
by what occurred during his absence, and declaring "It was clearly
a matter of no consequence that the evidence introduced in this
case in the absence of the prisoner may not have affected him,
and that he did not at the time take an exception." If, during an
involuntary absence of the defendant, an irregularity obviously
prejudicial to him occur, a new trial will everywhere be granted.
If there be no such irregularity, we encounter the difference of
opinion indicated by the cases above cited; the better rule would
seem to be that unless there, be a showing of prejudice, no new
trial should be granted, even for an involuntary absence of the
accused during trial. It is very doubtful, however, whether .the
more conservative of our courts would hold constitutional a
statute so providing, as it would undoubtedly be argued that such
a rule would deprive the defendant of his right to be heard by
himself and counsel and to be confronted with the witnesses
against him..
The presence of'the accused is of course unnecessary in the
appellate court. On writ of error to reverse a judgment in even
a capital case, the personal attendance of the defendant at the
argument or at the decision of the court is not necessary to give
such court jurisdiction.90
The courts haVe not agreed as to what the record must show
in regard to the defendant's presence during trial. In some jur-
isdictions it is held that it must affirmatively appear of record
that the defendant was present where his presence is necessary.
Under this view it would not be sufficient for the record to show
the presence of the defendant at the beginning and at the con-
clusion of the trial; it must affirmatively appear that he was pres-
ent at each substantive step in the proceeding.9' In Day v. Terri-
tory 2 the court said:
"It may be and more than likely is true, that the defendant
was in fact present at all times and that the error is an inad-
" People v. Clark, x Park. Cr. 36o (N. Y. 1852); Fielden v. People, z28
III. 595 (1889).
Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 69 Pa. 286 (i87z); State v. Christian, 3o
La. An. 367 (1878).
n2 Okla. 409 (1894).
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vertence in making up the record when his case was called for
consideration; but it would be a dangerous precedent to estab-
lish for the court to assume such to be the truth, and thus give
its assent to a conviction where the record fails to show that the
defendant was actually present."
In other States it is held sufficient if the presence of the defendant
can be gathered from the record by fair intendment or by neces-
sary and reasonable implication; if, therefore, it appears that the
defendant was present at the beginning of the trial, which by the
record is shown to have proceeded without interruption, the pre-
sumption follows that he was present during the remainder of it,
unless the contrary appear affi'rmati~'ely of record." The third
view is that the presence of the accused during the trial will be-
presumed unless the contrary appear affirmatively of record; a
record that is entirely silent as to whether or not the defendant
was present during his trial would be sufficient only under this
view.94 It is suggested that this view is the most logical of all,
inasmuch as it would prevent the granting of many new trials by
simply indulging in a presumption that proceedings in the trial
court have been entirely regular.
IV. PRESENCE OF JUDGE.
It has been laid down as a general rule in many jurisdictions
that the presence of the judge at every stage of the trial is essen-
tial to the validity of the proceedings; if he absent himself and
any part of the trial be conducted in his absence, a conviction can-
not be sustained. This rule is not a statutory one in any of our
States; it is a rule by decision, and its extent, as well as the na-
ture of the exceptions and qualifications that have been engrafted
upon it in some jurisdictions, can be learned only by an examina-
tion of the cases.
The reasons for the rule have been variously stated. It has
been said that the judge should be present during every stage of
" Brown v. State, -9 Fla. 543 (1892) ; Burney v. State, 32 Fla. 253 (1893) ;
Schirmer v. People, 33 I1. 276 (1864) ; State v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65 (1898) ;
State v. C6.ztello, 29 Wash. 366 (xgo2).
"State v. Daugherty, 63 Kan. 473 (9o0); Smith v. state, 6o Ga. 43o
(1878).
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the proceeding, as the defendant will otherwise be unable to ob-
ject to such irregularities as may occur during the absence. 95 The
presence of the judge has also been said to be necessary in order
that he may intelligently decide a motion for a new trial after
verdict,96 and because his immediate presence tends to preserve
the legal solemnity and security of trial, and upholds the majesty
of the law.97 But the reason most frequently given is that the
defendant has a constitutional right to a trial before a court duly
constituted; that there can be no court without a judge, and his
absence during any part of the trial works a disorganization of
the court, so that further proceedings are void and of no effect.98
The courts agree that the judge may change his seat in the
courtroom during the trial, or he may read or write or engage
temporarily in conversation. 0 Indeed, his presence is sometimes
construed to mean not absolutely within .the courtroom, but so
near as to be within sight and hearing of the proceedings; that is,
in such a situation as to retain control of all that occurs during
the trial.1' ° So in Graves v. People1 °1 the court held:
"While we do not say that every brief absence of a judge
from the courtroom, where he both sees and hears all that is
done, and can himself be seen and heard, necessarily constitutes
reversible error; yet, to be justified, the judge during such
absence, must not only be within hearing but within sight of
counsel and jury, and in such a position that he may be seen and
heard by them and able instantly to interpose his authority in
preserving decorum in the courtroom, and to pass upon questions
as they arise and assert and maintain that full control over the
trial which is so essential a part of due process of law."
"Carney v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 566 (19o5).
Slaughter v. U. S., 5 Ind. Ter. 234 (9o4); State v. Beuerman, 53 Pac.
Rep. 874 (Kan. i898).
'Hayes v. State, 58 Ga. 3S (1877) ; O'Brien v. People, 17 CoL 561 (189z).
"Ellerbe v. State, 75 Miss. 522 (1897); Graves v. People, 32 Col. 127
(1904); People v. Tupper, 122 Cal. 424 (i898); State v. Beuerman, 53 Pac.
Rep. 874 (Kan. i88); State v. Carnagy, io6 Ia. 483 (1898).
"State v. Carnagy, io6 Ia. 483 (1898).
"Miller v. State, 73 Ohio St. 195 0906); Rutter v. Territory, 1i Okla.
454 t1902). And see State v. Porter, io5 Ia. 677 (j898), and State v. Smith,
49 Conn. 376 (188), where it was held no error for the judge to be without
the court room, out of sight, but within hearing of the proceedings.
232 Col. 127 (904).
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While all of our courts regard an absence of the judge dur-
ing the trial as highly improper, they do not agree as to the effect
of the absence. If, during the absence, some irregularity occurs
obviously prejudicial to the defendant, it is well settled that a con-
viction will be set aside; so in Slaughter v. United States,
102
where the judge went into his chambers for approximately one
minute, but during his absence counsel for the government made
improper and misleading remarks to the jury, and in Turbeville
v. State,101 where during the absence of the judge the district
attorney in his argument appealec to the race prejudice of colored
jurors.
If it be not shown that defendant was prejudiced by some
irregularity occurring during the absence of the judge, thereis a
difference of opinion as to whether a new trial will be granted.
The weight of authority undoubtedly supports the proposition
that an absence of the judge during the trial is error regardless
of prejudice to the defendant; in other words, prejudice will be
presumed. This is clearly the "pjo sition taken in Bateson v.
State,1. 4 where it was held that if the judge by his absence "loses
that control and supervision of the court which is so necessary to
safeguard every right of a defendant in a particular case and a
conviction follow, it will be-set aside, notwithstanding no injury
can be pointed out. It is not so much what occurred during the
trial, as what might have occurred when the judge.was'absent and
not exercising a supervising control over the proceedings." Yet
the very court which decided that case found it inadvisable to
adhere to it in another, 105 in which the judge was absent but a
minute, and only missed part of the defendant's answer to a
question of the district attorney. In Georgia, at least, a brief
absence is not of itself error; it is there held that the mere ab-
sence of the judge during the progress of the trial, when no objec-
tion is made, will not necessarily require the granting of a new
trial, when the absence is only for a brief period of time and for
'Is Ind. Ter. 234 (3904).
'1 56 Miss. 793 (i879).
"'46 Tex. Cr. 34 (1904).
Scott v. State. 47 Tex. Cr. 568 (z9o5).
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a necessary purpose; and in order for such absence to become
reversible error, it must appear not only that objection was made
to the judge's failure to suspend the trial, but that the absence of
the judge resulted in some harm to the losing party.'06
There is also a difference of opinion as to the effect of con-
sent by the defendant or his counsel to the absence of the judge.
One view is that by consenting to the absence, the defendant
waives his right to the presence of the judge, and unless preju-
dice is shown, there is no error.107 But according to the weight
of authority, neither the accused nor his counsel can consent to
the absence, and such consent, if given, is not binding upon
them.108
It is held that the effect of the. absence is not at all changed
by the fact that the judge has directed someone else to perform his
functions during his absence. In spite of that fact, a new trial
must be granted, as the judge has no power to delegate judicial
authority to another.109
The judge has entire control of the trial. If any good reason
exists for his absence from the courtroom, after a trial has begun
and before it ends, he can suspend proceedings until his return. A
proper regard f6r the law on the part of the trial judge in a crim-
inal case would lead him to suspend proceedings during any
necessary absence. On the other hand, the rule requiring the
judge to be present, has been applied too strictly, and many new
trials have been unwisely granted. The absence of the judge
during some part of the trial should not of itself be ground for
reversal; the defendant should be required to show that he was
prejudiced by some irregularity occurring during his absence, and
he should be compelled to have an objection to the irregularity
" Pritchett v. State, 92 Ga. 65 (893) ; see also O'Shields v. State, 8x Ga.
301 (x888).
State v. Hammer, zx6 Ia. 284 (i902).
Turbeville v. State, 56 Miss. 793 (1879) ; Meredith v. People, 84 Ill. 479
(1877).
'" So where the judge called upon his daughter to preside during his
absence, Goodman v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 388 (1904); or upon an attorney,
Ellerbe v. State. 74 Miss. 522 (1897); or allowed a verdict to be received
in his absence by an attorney, Stewart v. State. 147 Ala. 137 (19o6) ; or by
telegraph directed the clerk to discharge a jury for inability to agree, State
v. Jefferson, 66 N. C. 309 (1872).
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entered of record. A statute embodying this idea would give
complete protection to the defendant, and at the same time pre-
vent the reversal of many convictions. There is a possible consti-
tutional objection to such legislation. It has been pointed out that
some of the courts have based the rule requiring the presence of
the judge at eVery stage of the proceedings upon the proposition
that the defendant is-entitled to be tried before a tribunal duly
constituted, and that the absence of the judge works a disorgani-
zation of the court. It is not suggested that the defendant in a
criminal case may be tried without a judge, but simply that an
absence of the judge during part of the trial should not work a
disorganization of the court. A reasonable interpretation of our
constitutions would support such a statute.
V.. LosT INDICTMENT.
In some States it is provided by statute that when an indict-
ment has been lost or destroyed, it shall be proper for the grand
jury to find another indictment against the defendant.l 10 Most
of the States, however, which have statutes on this subject, pro-
vide for a record of the indictment in a book provided for that
purpose, and in case of the loss or destruction of the indictment, a
certified copy of such record is by proper proceedings substituted
for the original.""1 In California the indictment is required to
be filed rather than recorded, and if lost or destroyed a copy may
be substituted for it. 112 In Texas, the substitution of a copy of
the original, or the finding of a new indictment is permitted in the
alternative. 113  The Texas statute in regard to substitution is
quoted, as suggesting a concise method of procedure:
"When an indictment or information has been lost mislaid,
mutilated, or obliterated, the district or county attorney may
suggest the fact to the court, and the same shall be entered upon
"'Wisconsin, Revised Statutes, 1911, §4672; West Virginia, Code, x9o6,
§4462; Rhode Island, General Laws, 19o9, p. 1309, §34; Kentucky, Statutes,
1Q03, §T140; Alabama, Criminal Code, 1907, §7157. And see Rosenberger v.
Comnonwealth, 118 Pa. 77 (1888).
. See for example Oklahoma, Revised Laws, i9io, Vol. 11, §6134; Mon-
tana, Revised Codes, 19o7, §9170; Mississippi, Code, 19o6, §1419.
, California, Penal Code, 1909. §8zo.
"Texas, Criminal Statutes, 191i, Art. 462.
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the minutes of the court, and in such case, another indictment or
information may be substituted, upon the written statement of
the district or county attorney, that it is substantially the same
as that which has been lost, mislaid, mutilated, or obliterated."
The word "indictment" in the discussion which follows may be
taken to refer also to the "information," as the rules of substitu-
tion are in each case the same.
The power of substitution has been said to exist independent
of any statute. The doctrine is that there is an inherent power in
the court to preserve and protect its jurisdiction when it has once
attached, and to that end it may substitute any of its records which
may be lost, by properly authenticated copies. This doctrine has
been frequently applied to the substitution of lost indictments.11 4
In State ex rel. Null v. Circuit Court,115 on an application for an
order supplying lost or stolen indictments, carbon copies were ob-
tained from the State's attorney, and from the defendant's attor-
ney, from which copies were made, and both the State's attorney
and the clerk, who read the originals on the arraignment, and who
made the certified copies for the defendant, testified that they
believed the copies to be true and correct. The circuit court re-
fused to certify the copies, and it was held that such certification
might properly be compelled by mandamus, the court pointing
out that "yery court must have inherent power to protect and
preserve its own records; otherwise, it could not perform the
functions for which it is created. The indictments in question
became public records when filed with the clerk. The government,
the defendant, and every inhabitant of the State was concerned in
their preservation. When it-was suggested that they had been
lost or stolen, it was the duty of the court on its own motion, if
its inherent power had not been otherwise invoked, to have caused
the return of the original documents to their proper custodian, or
failing in this, to have ascertained with reasonable certainty the
contents of each, and ordered the filing of copies corresponding in
every material respect with the originals. Such we believe to be
the power and duty of every court existing by virtue of organized
"' State v. Rivers, 58 Ia. io2 (1882).1 o4 N. W. Rep. 1o48 (S. D. 19o5).
634 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
law, with respect to all its records, whether civil or criminal, and
that it cannot be deprived of such power or excused from per-
forming such duty by any legislative enactment."
Statutes providing for substitution in case of a lost or de-
stroyed indictment are held constitutional;'16 indeed, there ap-
pears to be no question but that substitution at any time after
arraignment and plea is entirely proper.117 The matter of sub-
stitution before arraignment and plea is not so clear. In Gana-
way v. State"" the solicitor for the State moved the court for
leave to substitute a copy of the indictment for the original,
which had been lost or destroyed; it was proved to the court that
the paper offered was a correct copy of the original indictment,
the court permitted the substitution, though the defendant had
not then been arraigned. The supreme court held this error and
denounced substitution in general in criminal cases in terms quite
broad enough to forbid any substitution of a lost indictment.
either before or after plea. But the same court in Bradford v.
State,'1 9 permitted substitution after arraignment and plea, and
the court distinguished Ganaway v. State, holding substitu-
tion during the trial to be within the inherent power of the court.
Ganauway v. State, however, has been mentioned in a number of
cases in support of the proposition that substitution is improper
before plea. The, constitutional provision that no person can be
held to answer a criminal charge unless on presentment or indict-
ment of a grand jury has been invoked to show that substitution
is improper where the defendant has not pleaded to the indict-
ment. It is believed that this provision does not justify a distinc-
tion between substitution before and after plea. It is reasonable
to require that the original indictment must have been filed or
recorded, and unless this has been done there can be no substitu-
tion, if the indictment is lost or destroyed;120 but after filing or
"'McGuire v. State, -6 Miss. 504 0898); Schultz v. State, x5 Tex. Ap.
258 (1883).
. State v. Heard, 49 La. An. 375 (1897) ; Schultz v. State, 15 Tex. All.
258 (1883) ; Harmon v. Territory, g Okla. 313 (9oo); Mount v. State, 14
Ohio, 295 (1846); People v. Smith, 9 Cal. Ap. 224 (i9o8).
"*'22 Ala. 772 (1853).
"'54 Ala. 23o (187s).
eState v. Simpson, 67 Mo. 647 (1878).
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recording, substitution should be permitted before as well as after
arraignment and plea. There are decisions so holding.121
There- is a further difference of opinion as to whether the
substituted copy must be an exact copy of the original indict-
ment, or whether a substantial copy is sufficient. In States
where the indictment is required to be recorded in full, it is a
comparatively simple matter to produce an exact copy of the
original; but where filing only is required, it might be difficult to
procure an exact copy. It has been held that a substantial copy
is sufficient.122 In State v. Thomas, 23 on motion to substitute
an alleged copy of a lost indictment, the attorney who made the
motion testified that he never saw the original nor a copy of it,
nor consulted with the attorney who drew it as to its contents;
and that he drew the proposed substitute after examining and
having returned to their custodian the minutes of -the evidence
before the grand jury. The attorney who drew the original tes-
tified that the substitute contained substantially all the allega-
tions in the original, but that he could not say it was a true copy;
that it was more voluminous than the original, and contained
allegations not in the latter. The court held that the evidence
introduced in support of the motion failed to show with the cer-
tainty that should be required in such a case that the proposed
substitute was even a substantial copy of the indictment and the
substitution was refused. This decision is undoubtedly correct
upon its facts, but it is suggested that a substantial copy should
be considered sufficient for all purposes, and that it is entirely
unnecessary to require an exact copy of the lost indictment for
the purpose of substitution.
Where the original indictment has been lost or destroyed,
no further steps may be taken in the case unless substitution is
made, or a new indictment found, where that is. proper. Fur-
ther proceedings in the absence of the missing document are
'Withers v. State, 21 Tex. Cr. 210 (i886); McDowell v. State, 55 Tex.
Cr. 596 (gog); Commonwealth v. Becker, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 43o (igoo).
in Magee v. State, 14 Tex. Cr. 366 (1883) ; State v. Paul, 87 Mo. Ap. 47
(9oo).
1,97 Ia. 396 (1896).
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ground for a new trial.12 4  It is for the court to determine
whether an exigency has arisen requiring substitution,12 and
the substitution may be made only upon order of the court. 12 6
So in State v. Burks,1 27 it was held:
"The clerk had no right to incorporate the paper purporting
to be a copy of the indictment in the record even though re-
quested to do so by the prosecuting attorney, and it cannot be
treated as part of the record. It is one thing for a court to order
a pleading substituted for one that is lost, after a hearing and
after being satisfied that the substituted copy is the same or
substantially the same as that which has been lost or destroyed,
and quite another for one of the parties in vacation, or even in
term time, to substitute a copy of a lost pleading without notice
to his adversary and without the knowledge or permission of
the court whose record is to be thus affected."
When it is proposed to substitute a copy for a lost indictment, it
has been held that the defendant is entitled to be heard and to
contest the substitution if he sees fit. ' 28
The rule as to substitution is of course applied to indict-
ments stolen1 29 or mutilated,13 0 as iell as those lost or destroyed.
On the other hand, where the indictment has been sent up with
the record to the appellate court and has not been returned to the
lower court in which a second trial is had, substitution has been
held improper, as the original indictment is neither lost nor
destroyed, and could be easily procured by suitable proceed-
ings.1
31
Where by statute a new indictment by the grand jury fol-
lows the loss of the original, it is necessary also to provide for
'Freeman v. State, 6 Tex. Ap. 462 (1879) ; Buckner v. State, 56 Ind. 2o8
(x877).
Epperson v. State, 5 Lea, 2g1 (Tenn. x88o).
Clampitt v. State, 3 Tex. Ap. 638 (81"8).
"' 132 Mo. 363 (86).
'Bowers v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 185 (i9o3).
'Mount v. State, 14 Ohio, 295 (z846); State v. Paul, 87 Mo. Ap. 47
(1900); State v. Gardner, 13 Lea, 134 (Tenn. 1884).
'" uff v. State, 23 Tex. Cr. 291 (1887). Cf. Commonwealth v. Roland,
97 Mass. s-96 (1867), where an indictment had been torn in three pieces, and
the court permitted the three pieces to be united and the restored instrument
to be the basis of further proceedings.
'% Shehane v. State, ia Tex. Ap. 533 (883) ; see also Boyd v. State, 6
Cold. i (Tenn. x868).
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the time within which such new indictment may be found, 8 2 as
otherwise the Statute of Limitations would sometimes prevent
further prosecution; but in the process of substitution of an
indictment, the Statute of Limitations presents no difficulties.
Substitution in a pending case is not the institution of a new
suit or a new prosecution; it is merely an ancillary proceeding in
the action then pending. In other words, if the original indict-
ment were returned at a time when the offense was not barred,
it cannot avail a defendant, if the indictment becomes lost, that
a motion to substitute was entertained .at a time when, if treated
as a new prosecution, the offense would be barred.133
It is held in Texas that the record must show that an order
of the court has been made allowing substitution,284 and that it
must also show that the proposed substitution was in fact
made. 135 In Rogers v. State 8" the record showed that the orig-
inal indictment had been lost, that the county attorney filed a
written statement suggesting the loss and asking leave to substi-
tute, and that the court, being satisfied that a copy submitted
by the county attorney was correct, ordered that leave be granted.
On appeal the court reversed the case, because "there was no
judgment of the court declaring the fact of substitution. The
record must show affirmatively the fact that the substitution as
proposed by the county attorney was made." Where the record
discloses the order of the court permitting substitution, it is
suggested that the court might well presume that the substitu-
tion was in fact made.
The mere finding of the original indictment without an
order of the court revoking the substitution does not affect the
status of the case, which will proceed upon the substituted in-
dictment until and unless such order is made.137 The court may,
sKentucky, Statutes, i9o3, §xz4o; Rhode Island, General LAws, 19a9,
p. 1309, §34 ; West Virginia, Code, 19o6, §4.
'Thompson v. State, 54 Miss. 74o (1877); Brown, . State, 57 Tex. Cr.
570 (1910).
' Graham v. State, %.3 Tex. 55o (875).
Beardall v. State, 9 Tex. Ap. 262 (88o); Carter v. State, 4z Tex. Cr.
6o8 (1goo).
Il zr Tex. Ap. 6o8 (882).
'" Branson v. State, 99 Ga. 194 (1896).
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however, direct that the trial proceed upon the original indict-
ment, and will so order, if it is found pending the subtitu-
tion. 138
(To be Concluded.)
Howard A. Lehman.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
-MOwens v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. X4 (1904).
